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begin my formal remarks, let me review
the Circuit's record before the Supreme Court in the
term just completed. Twelve cases from the Second
Circuit came before the Court during the 1988 term;
the Circuit was affirmed in seven cases and was reversed in just five. In a thirteenth case, United States
v. Halper^ a district court in the Southern District of
New York was substantially affirmed on direct appeal. On the whole, then, it was a relatively successful term.

Before

I

Today

I

would

like

to

share with you a few

thoughts about the choices confronting the civil
rights community in this nation. For many years, no
institution of American government has been as
close a friend to civil rights as the United States Supreme Court. Make no mistake: I do not mean for a

mond,

was no need to decide anything other than that the plan was too imprecisely
tailored. Instead, the Court chose to deliver a discourse on the narrow limits within which states and
localities may engage in affirmative action, and on
the special infirmities of plans passed by cities with
minority leaders. The Court was even more aggressive in revisiting settled statutory issues under Section 1981 and Title VII. In Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 4 the Court took the extraordinary step
of calling for rebriefing on a question that no party
had raised: whether the Court, in the 1976 case of
Runyon v. McCrary, 5 had wrongly held Section 1981
for example, there

to apply to private acts of racial discrimination.

Wards Cove

And

6

to denigrate the quite considerable contri-

Atonio, the Court implicitly overruled Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 7 another established precedent which had required employers to

butions to the enhancement of civil rights by presidents, the Congress, other federal courts, and the
legislatures and judiciaries of many states.
It is now 1989, however, and we must recognize
that the Court's approach to civil rights cases has
changed markedly. The most recent Supreme Court
opinions vividly illustrate this changed judicial atti-

bear the burden of justifying employment practices
with a disparate impact on groups protected by Title
VII. Henceforth, the burden will be on the employees to prove that these practices are unjustified.
Stare decisis has special force on questions of statutory interpretation and Congress had expressed no
dissatisfaction with either the Runyon or Griggs de-

moment

tude. In

Richmond

v.

Croson, 2 the Court took a

broad swipe at affirmative action, making it extraordinarily hard for any state or city to fashion a raceconscious remedial program that will survive its
constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the Court went so
far as to express its doubts that the effects of past racial

discrimination are

mond, and

And

in

still felt

in the city

of Rich-

in society as a whole.

a series of cases interpreting federal

civil

Court imposed new and stringent
procedural requirements that make it more and
rights statutes, the

more

difficult for the civil rights plaintiff to gain

vindication. 3

The most striking feature of last term's opinions
was the expansiveness of their holdings; they often
addressed broad issues, wholly unnecessary to the
decisions. To strike down the set-aside plan in Rich-

in

cisions.

Thus

v.

it is

difficult to characterize last term's

decisions as a product of anything other than a re-

trenching of the

we have

years,

civil rights

truly

come

agenda. In the past 35

full circle.

my

disappointment with last term's
civil rights decisions, we must do more than dwell on
past battles. The important question now is where
the civil rights struggle should go from here.
Regardless of

suppose, is nowhere at all — to stay
put. With the school desegregation and voting rights
cases and with the passage of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the argument goes, the principal
civil rights battles have already been won, the structural protections necessary to assure racial equality
over the long run are already in place, and we can
trust the Supreme Court to ensure that they remain

One

so.

answer,

I

This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
Affirmative action, no less than the active effort to
alleviate concrete economic hardship, hastens relief
efforts while the victims are still around to be
helped. And to those who claim that present statutes
already afford enough relief to victims of ongoing
discrimination, I say, look to the case of Brenda Patterson. She alleged that she had been victimized by a
pattern of systematic racial harassment at work—
but she was told by the Supreme Court that, even accepting her allegations as true, federal statutory re-

was unavailable.
avoid complacency for another reason.
The Court's decisions last term put at risk not only
lief

We must

the

civil rights

of minorities, but of

when

tory teaches that

the

all citizens.

His-

Supreme Court has been

willing to shortchange the equality rights of minor-

groups, other basic personal civil liberties like the
rights to free speech and to personal security against
unreasonable searches and seizures are also threat-

ity

from the

state establishment

members of

the Court served notice that they are

ready to replace today's establishment clause inquiry
with a test that those who seek to break down the
wall between church and state will find far easier to
16
We dare not forget that these, too, are civil
satisfy
rights, and that they apparently are in grave danger.
The response to the Court's decisions is not inaction; the Supreme Court remains the institution
charged with protecting constitutionally guaranteed
rights and liberties. Those seeking to vindicate civil
rights or equality rights must continue to press this
Court for the enforcement of constitutional and
statutory mandates. Moreover, the recent decisions
suggest alternate methods to further the goals of
equality in contexts other than judicial forums.
For example, state legislatures can act to
strengthen the hands of those seeking judicial redress.
lesson of the Richmond case is that detailed

A

legislative fact-finding

It is difficult to characterize last terms decisions

as a product of anything other than a retrenching

of the

civil rights agenda.

we have
ened.

truly

We

come full

In the past

35 years,

circle.

tion after the

Supreme Court held separate

to be

9
Ferguson, it held in the Schenck
and Debs 10 decisions that the first amendment allowed the United States to convict under the Espionage Act persons who distributed antiwar pamphlets and delivered antiwar speeches. It was less
than a decade after the Supreme Court upheld the
internment of Japanese citizens 11 that, in Dennis v.
United States, 12 it affirmed the conviction of Communist Party agitators under the Smith Act. On the
other side of the ledger, it is no coincidence that during the three decades beginning with Brown v. Board
of Education, the Court was taking its most expansive view not only of the equal protection clause, but
also of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of

equal in Plessy

9,

v.

of equal rights and liberty rights are
inexorably intertwined was never more apparent
than in the opinions handed down last term. The
right to be free from searches which are not justified
by probable cause was dealt yet another heavy blow
in the drug testing cases. 13 The scope of the right to
reproductive liberty was called into considerable
question by the Webster decision. 14 Although the
right to free expression was preserved in several celebrated cases, it lost ground, too, most particularly in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 15 which greatly
broadened the government's power to impose "time,

That the

Civil rights lawyers

stand a far better chance in federal constitutional litigation over affirmative action if they are
armed with a state legislature's documented findings
of past discrimination in a particular area. Thus persons interested in the cause of racial equality can ensure that legislators have access to empirical studies
historical facts that will

form the bedrock of ac-

ceptable factual findings.

Most importantly, there is Congress. With the
mere passage of corrective legislation, Congress can
an instant regain the ground which was lost last
term in the realm of statutory civil rights. And by
prevailing upon Congress to do so, we can send a
message to the Court — that the hypertechnical language games played by the Court last term in its interpretations of civil rights enactments are simply
not accurate ways to read Congress's broad intent in
in

the

civil rights area.

In the 1990s

and

we must

target other

broaden our perspective

governmental bodies as well as

the traditional protector

Rights.

place and

is critical.

will

and
forget at our peril that less than a genera-

of religion: in a sep-

arate opinion in the creche-and-menorah case, four

of our

liberties.

fates

manner"

on the horizon

restrictions

are attacks

on speech. Looming

on the

right to be free

me emphasize

we need
not and should not give up on the Supreme Court,
and while federal litigation on civil rights issues still
can succeed, in the 1990s we must broaden our perIn closing,

let

that while

governmental bodies as
well as the traditional protector of our liberties.
Paraphrasing President Kennedy, those who wish to
assure the continued protection of important civil
rights should "ask not what the Supreme Court
alone can do for civil rights: ask what you can do to
help the cause of civil rights." Today, the answer to
spective

and

target other

bringing pressure to bear on

all

branches of federal and state governmental units

in-

that question

lies in

eluding the Court and to urge them to undertake the

remain to be won. With
us go forward together to

battles for civil liberties that

that goal as our guide,

let

advance civil rights and liberty rights with the fervor
we have shown in the past. Thank you very much.
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